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Abstract The political desire for further integration within the European Union will have
an increasing effect on the financial services industry, including banking and credit
lending. Harmonisation can potentially have great benefit for consumers as the
European banks compete for their business across the Union. Harmonisation, however,
brings with it a set of decisions for both credit grantors and regulators. There are issues
associated with information that can be used in risk assessment to ensure fair decisions
in granting credit. In the past the rules have been developed under national legislation.
EU directives seek to harmonise the national rules and provide a new guidance on
variables that may be held. The major concern relates to the issue of discrimination. The
aim of the law is to promote the principle of equal treatment, which can be interpreted in
a number of ways. The legal interpretation of discrimination does not necessarily
coincide with the economic standpoint. Furthermore, previous empirical research
suggests that prohibition of variables may not only affect the ability to distinguish
between good and bad risk, but may also be disadvantageous to the groups the
legislation is supposed to protect. This paper explores these issues from both theoretical
and practical points of view.
Keywords European Union harmonisation, credit scoring, anti-discrimination laws,
regulation
INTRODUCTION
A single market implies that eventually
services offered will be available across all
national boundaries with the European
Union (EU). This requires political
negotiation to establish an acceptable level
of consumer protection across the EU,
including equal treatment of credit
applicants. Equal treatment implies not
discriminating against specified groups.
This is established through Article 12 EC
that proclaims non-discrimination on the
grounds of nationality, and Article 13 EC
that lays the foundation for combating
discrimination based on sex, racial or
ethnic origin, religion or belief, disability,
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time the Basel Banking Agreement
requires appropriate systems for granting
credit and assessing the liability. This has
added an impetus to the use of credit
scoring providing a systematic approach to
the granting of credit.
Credit scoring provides an assessment of
the probability of an applicant defaulting
on credit. Usually based on computational
approaches using historic data on previous
borrowers, it relates various characteristics
of the applicant to the creditworthiness or
probability of default of an individual.
Individuals become classed as ‘good’ — do
not default — or ‘bad’ — default. The
approach constructs a ‘scorecard’, which is
the sum of weights assigned to the specific
characteristics of the individual. The
characteristics are variables either supplied
by the application form or from credit
reference agencies (CRA). The former
consists of sociodemographic data, such as
age, residential status, occupation and
income, while the latter covers previous
credit history: total amount of debt, any
past defaults or delinquencies. Credit
scoring implicitly means that a population
is divided into two groups: good payers
and bad payers. Hence by its nature it is
discriminatory. Regulators clearly become
concerned if such division is
discriminatory against some groups within
society protected by law.
Legislation already exists at national
level within the European Union to
promote social justice policies and to
ensure appropriate handling of confidential
personal information. It has the effect of
prohibiting the use of certain variables in
credit scoring. More recently, EU
directives have reinforced these statutes of
member states (MS), for example Article
13 which is being implemented through a
set of directives. This paper explores the
impact of these legal restrictions on both
lenders and borrowers. In the past there
has been considerable research in the USA
on anti-discrimination credit regulation
but there has been insufficient research
focused on the European context. The
authors argue that although the US and
EU legislation is different, it is possible to
draw quite strong parallels and that is why
lessons learned in the US environment are
relevant for Europe.
Among the lessons learned the authors
would like to emphasise the following
insights:
— What constitutes discrimination in the
legal sense may not necessarily be
regarded as such from the economic
point of view
— There is evidence to conclude that legal
restrictions on the credit scoring
models lead to reduction in their
predictive ability
— The benefits for disadvantaged groups
are more of political value than of
practical character
— While the law seeks to eliminate both
direct discrimination (making a
distinction between people on
prohibited grounds) and indirect
discrimination (inequality in the
outcome for different groups), in
application to credit scoring it is only
possible to rule out either direct or
indirect discrimination, but not both.
The paper illustrates that these arguments
can be extended into the EU environment
and explores the situation when
‘nationality’ cannot be used as one of the
variables in credit scoring models.
The paper explores both the theoretical
and practical issues associated with
discrimination in credit risk assessment and
highlights some controversies and gaps in
the existing legislation. The next section
discusses the concept of discrimination and
provides an overview of anti-
discrimination regulations in the USA and
EU. The following section demonstrates
that the removal of prohibited variables
does not necessarily eliminate
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discrimination. The paper then explores
the effect for both the lender and the
borrower of the anti-discrimination
legislature. Finally, the paper investigates
the effect that the removal of ‘nationality’
may have on the acceptance for credit of
people of different nationalities.
Conclusions are then drawn.
DISCRIMINATION
By its nature credit scoring implies
selection and hence discrimination. For the
selection process to become illegal ‘. . .
there must first be a law, and this must
define the prohibited grounds of action,
the person protected by the law, and the
circumstances in which they are
protected’.1 Nation states have developed
their own legislative approaches. Tables
A1 and A2 provide a summary of the
national diversity in the prohibition of
variables and the scope of the application
of the law (see Appendix). In the USA the
legislation has been directed specifically at
discrimination in credit markets whereas in
the European Union the legal constraints
arise from general anti-discrimination
provisions covering other areas apart from
credit.
In the USA the Equal Credit
Opportunity Act (ECOA) prohibits
characteristics from being used in credit
scoring that lead to discrimination on the
basis of race, colour, national origin, age,
gender, marital status, religion, receipt of
public assistance, or exercise of rights
granted by consumer protection statutes.
ECOA distinguishes between judgmental
and statistical scoring, and allows the use
of age in the latter provided it does not
lead to the disadvantage of applicants over
the age of 62.
In the US regulations the distinction is
made between:
— overt discrimination: explicit use of
forbidden variables in scoring models
— disparate treatment: judgmental or
subjective discrimination, which may
occur when the score derived from the
statistical model is judgmentally
adjusted
— the disparate impact, which occurs
when the model does not contain
prohibited variables but leads to
excessive rejection of borrowers of a
certain race or gender. In this case, the
lender needs to show there is a ‘business
necessity’ for using particular variables
and there is no equally effective way of
making the credit decision.2
In the EU the legal constraints on
consumer credit follow from:
— treaties: the aforementioned Articles 12
and 13 EC, and Article 3 EC that
proclaim equality between men and
women3
— Directive 2000/43/EC of June 2000
implementing the principle of equal
treatment between persons irrespective
of racial and ethnic origin. The
Directive goes beyond the labour
market, covering the ‘access to and
supply of goods and services which are
available to [the] public’
— Data Protection Directive.4 The clause
concerning sensitive data imposes
prohibition on processing of
information ‘revealing the racial or
ethnic origin, political opinions,
religious or philosophical beliefs, trade
union membership, health or sex life
[of the public] with some exemptions.
In general, EU law provides some
minimum standards and requirements, so
that member states cannot go below them,
but can go above. And some EU states do
go further and adopt more stringent anti-
discrimination regulations than the EU
laws. Austria, Italy, the Netherlands and
the UK have acts that outlaw
discrimination in access to services and
24
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goods on grounds wider than race and
ethnic origin. For example, in the UK
discrimination is forbidden not only on
the grounds of race, but also on the
grounds of sex, disability, religion and
belief.
Even ‘racial grounds’ have a broader
scope: the UK 1976 Race Relations Act5
covers the grounds of race, colour,
nationality (including citizenship), ethnic
or national origin. The Act declares
unlawful ‘segregating a person from other
persons on racial grounds’ or in other
words, direct discrimination. This is equal
to overt discrimination in the USA or
prohibition to use the previously listed
variables in scoring models. At the same
time the Act states that even when any
requirement is applied equally to all
persons, but ‘the proportion of persons of
the same racial group as that other who
can comply with it is considerably smaller
than the proportion of persons not of that
racial group who can comply with it’, this
also constitutes discrimination. So if the
members of an ethnic group have lower
incomes, shorter terms of living at the
same address or working in the same job,
compared to other ethnic groups, and
these variables are included into credit risk
assessment, and therefore, members of the
disadvantaged group are granted less
credit, this also constitutes discrimination,
unless it can be shown that the
requirement is ‘justifiable’.
Furthermore, the recent amendment of
the said Act which followed the
implementation of the EU Race Directive,
states that even if the requirement is
applied equally to all persons, but
members of a certain ethnic group would
be at a disadvantage, then it is necessary to
show that this requirement constitutes
‘proportionate means of achieving a
legitimate aim’. In principle, this echoes
the disparate impact of the US regulations.
The above describes the legal position in
terms of discrimination. From an
economic viewpoint there are generally
two meanings: taste-based discrimination,
which can be deemed subjective and
statistical discrimination, which can be
deemed objective. Taste-based
discrimination arises from preferences or
prejudice and according to Becker7 and
Peterson and Peterson8 the person must
pay extra in order to have the privilege of
not dealing with certain groups. It is
assumed there exists a point beyond which
it becomes too expensive to discriminate.
This leads to the conclusion that by the
operation of market forces the
discrimination will eventually be
eliminated.
Statistical discrimination arises from the
lack of information necessary to calculate
the degree of risk.9,10 It is assumed that
individuals will behave like the group of
which they are members, since there is
insufficient information on the individual.
Hence the risk estimate for the group is
attributed to the individual and this may
lead to differential behaviour with respect
to the individual. This can be regarded as
objective risk, but is still discriminatory
against the individual based on the
assumed group behaviour. So if the
historic credit behaviour of a group is
poor then it is deemed that individuals
from the group will have a higher
probability of default in the future. The
lender might reasonably argue that this
type of discrimination is economically
rational and hence market forces will not
eliminate the discrimination. It would
constitute discrimination if members of a
demographic group are more likely to be
rejected by the lender than those from
other groups with similar characteristics
besides group membership.11 Hence the
membership of the group is influencing
the default probability.
Avery10 differentiates this form of
discrimination into two types: the
‘endowment’ effect and the ‘mean shift’
effect. The endowment effect results from
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a difference in the economic variables
between the groups and hence it can be
argued that it does not constitute
discrimination but a response to these
differences. The mean shift effect describes
those cases where group membership
provides information about default beyond
that supplied by the economic variables.
Practically, though, it will be shown in the
next section that it is not possible to
differentiate between these two effects
since often group membership is correlated
with economic measures.
All three forms (taste-based, endowment
effect and mean shift) are subject to legal
restrictions. If the information about
group membership is being used within
the decision-making process then there is
direct discrimination, which is illegal,
regardless of whether it is based on
subjective judgment or statistical
modelling. If there is a difference in the
acceptance rates, it constitutes indirect
discrimination, and whether it is legal or
not is open to interpretation by the law-
enforcement authorities, as will be shown
below.
PROHIBITION DOES NOT RESOLVE
DISCRIMINATION
Initially it was assumed that all that was
necessary to avoid discrimination was to
ensure that the variables indicating
membership of specific groups should be
removed. Unfortunately it is not as simple
as this. Illustrations of this effect are easier
to obtain from US data since their laws
require disclosure of information on
performance of specific groups. For
example the Home Mortgage Disclosure
Act (HMDA) requires data on race to be
disclosed on loans granted and loans
denied.
Munnel et al.12 using the HMDA data
in the Boston area found that black and
Hispanic applicants were nearly three
times as likely to be denied credit as white
applicants. Also those applying for
properties in areas with a higher
percentage of blacks and Hispanics were
more likely to be rejected. That led to the
accusations that bankers were using race as
a variable in the credit granting process.
These findings, though, were criticised by
a number of statisticians and
economists.11,13–15 As indicated by
Yinger11 there are methodological
difficulties in estimating the importance of
the ‘race’ coefficient since many of the
applicants’ characteristics are correlated
with race. If any of these variables are
missing then the estimate of the ‘race’
coefficient will be affected with the
possibility of it being overestimated. This
is referred to as omitted-variable bias.
To overcome this criticism Munnel et
al.16 included 38 additional variables,
which comprehensively covered all
possible factors that lenders used for
predicting default. In doing so they
reduced the relative rejection ratio for
blacks and Hispanics and whites from 2.8
to 1 down to 1.8 to 1. The new study also
found that there was no evidence of
discrimination due to racial composition of
the area.
Yinger11 also suggested further concerns
about the estimation of significance of
discrimination. Bostic17 had found that the
race indicator was significantly correlated
with the economic variables used by
Munnel’s analysis and that there was
significant difference in the economic
measures between the populations. Bostic
went further, to suggest that one could
not claim discrimination was a general
phenomenon, since the differences in
probability only existed for a marginal
applicant with low economic and poor
credit history and that one could not
determine whether the discrimination was
occurring because of race or on economic
grounds.
The study shifted the attention of US
legislators towards indirect discrimination,
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since although race was removed from the
decision-making process, the inequality in
the outcome of the decision remained. For
example, Crook18 in the analysis of US
household debt established that being
black increases the chance of being credit
constrained. The use of specific variables in
the credit scoring system is justified if it is
statistically related to loan performance
and has an ‘understandable relationship’ to
the applicant’s creditworthiness.19 There
clearly is considerable debate over the
subjective concept of ‘understandable
relationship’.
In the EU, indirect discrimination ‘can be
objectively justified by a legitimate aim’ if
‘the means of achieving that aim are
appropriate and necessary’. In application to
credit scoring, this statement can be
interpreted in a number of ways, since on
the European level there is no explanation
of which means are appropriate and
necessary in credit risk assessment.
In the UK this problem is partially
resolved by the Guide to Credit Scoring20
compiled by the credit industry and
approved by The Office of Fair Trading
and Department of Trade and Industry.
Although this document lays down the
principles of appropriate standards for
credit risk assessment, it is not legally
binding. Para 2.4 of the Guide states that
‘Credit Scoring will not discriminate on
the grounds of sex, race, religion,
disability or colour’. It is not clear whether
the statement covers direct or indirect
discrimination or both.
IMPACT ON CREDIT GRANTING
The prohibition of direct discrimination
provides no guarantee against the
discrepancy in acceptance rates between
different sociodemographic groups. If the
equality in outcome of the decision is to
be achieved then some provisions against
indirect discrimination should be made. In
fact, it can be shown that the prohibition
of direct discrimination alone can work
against both lenders and borrowers. It can
also be shown, however, that in the
context of credit scoring it is impossible to
satisfy the requirement to eliminate both
direct and indirect discrimination.
Before approaching the question of the
impact of legal constraints on lenders and
borrowers, it is necessary to establish
whether the prohibited variables are
related to the default probability and in
what way. Intuitively one may feel that
there is a relationship between the
prohibited variables and the default
probability, otherwise there is no point in
prohibition. There is also some empirical
evidence available, however,
predominantly from the US environment.
A number of studies21–25 found that
women and older borrowers were less
risky than other borrowers. So one can
argue on the basis of this research that
some protected classes are actually more
creditworthy than some unprotected
groups. But in contrast to older age and
gender, the evidence on relationship
between race and default appears to be
controversial. Elliehausen and Durkin26
argue that racial minorities do have a
higher probability of default based on the
findings of Avery25 and Boyes et al.24 The
recent study by Martin and Hill27 provides
further evidence of higher default rates for
racial minorities. On the other hand,
Munnel et al.16 refer to Van Order et al.28
who found the contrary evidence for some
parts of the USA.
If there is a relationship between
prohibited variables and default
probability, the implications for lenders
are straightforward: if they cannot find
legally acceptable substitutes
for prohibited variables the predictive
ability of models (the ability to distinguish
between good and bad credit risks) will
deteriorate, and lenders will incur loss.
A study on the effect of limiting
information in credit scoring models was
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carried out by Shinkel.29 He developed
eight discriminant models, from which
seven models excluded attributes
prohibited by the ECOA and one model
contained the prohibited variables. His
results indicated that exclusion of
prohibited variables reduced the number
of good loans accepted (0.3–2.3 per cent)
and increased the number of bad loans
accepted (0–2.6 per cent) with a reduction
in profitability of 2–16 per cent.
On the other hand, Elleihausen and
Durkin26 refer to studies that demonstrated
the opposite result,30,31 which concluded
that there were no significant differences in
predictive ability with and without
gender, marital status and age. It was
noted, however, that both data sets
excluded rejected applicants from their
analysis. Another possible reason for
getting such results is the possible presence
of variables strongly correlated with the
excluded ones, so that the variables
remaining in the model ‘proxy’ the
prohibited ones.
At the same time, there is no evidence
to prove that prohibition of certain
characteristics increased the acceptance
rates for protected groups. The analysis by
Chandler and Ewert22 suggests that
separate risk profiles for male and female
applicants may identify credit risk more
precisely than a model which ignores
applicants’ gender or one which allows for
only limited differences in male and female
risk profiles. And what is more important,
the acceptance rates for females are higher
when the sex is included in the model. So
one can conclude that ECOA appeared to
disadvantage rather than benefit female
applicants.
From theoretical consideration it is
possible to show that if scorecards are built
for separate sub-groups within the
population then the sub-population
scorecards tend to reject fewer applicants
than full population scorecards. That
follows from the Yule-Simpson
paradox.32,33 The paradox arises when the
relationship between the outcome and
predictor variables changes depending on
the value of a third variable. Examples of
the Yule-Simpson paradox abound in
medicine.34–37
To illustrate the Yule-Simpson paradox
when applied to consumer credit, consider
the following example, which is totally
hypothetical. Table 1 gives the breakdown
of accepted applications by sex,
employment status and outcome. The
numbers in parenthesis are probabilities of
being ‘good’ given employment status.
Whereas both male and female
applicants with full-time jobs are better
credit risks, the part-time status appears to
be associated with more creditworthy
behaviour, if no distinction between sexes
is made. This example illustrates that
although women are better credit risks
than men, they are not ‘rewarded’ for this
in the ‘sexless’ scorecard.
Yule-Simpson’s paradox arises because
the combined probabilities are averages
weighted by the fraction of each sex. Since
a greater proportion of those with part-
time status is women, more weight is
given to women in the combined
probability for part-time status. On the
Table 1 Number of accepted cases by applicant’s sex and employment status
Applicant’s sex
Male Female Combined
Outcome Good Bad Good Bad Good Bad
Employment status Full-time 130 (0.62) 80 30 (0.75) 10 160 (0.64) 90
Part-time 40 (0.57) 30 130 (0.72) 50 170 (0.68) 80
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contrary, the full-time marginal
probability reflects the male dominance in
this employment category. This situation
can be easily remedied either by
segmentation or stratification, but if there
are legal restrictions on the use of sex in a
scorecard, this does not appear possible.
Therefore, the inability to distinguish
between different sub-groups makes the
lenders apply one generalised scale to all
applicants, which is detrimental to both
lenders and borrowers. Furthermore, if
protected groups constitute the minority
in overall population, they will be assessed
on the white male scale simply because
their characteristics will be given less
weight in the statistical analysis. It may
sound paradoxical, but in order to
eliminate discrimination in the social sense,
it is necessary to discriminate in the
statistical sense.
NATIONALITY
In the European context Platts and
Howe38 found that the predictive power
of the model decreases when no distinction
is made between nationality or country of
residence. And nationality is one of the
variables that comes under the scrutiny of
European law. In France the national data
protection authority, Commission
National de l’Informatique et des Libertés
(CNIL), explicitly prohibited the use of
nationality in credit scoring models in
1998.39 Recently, however, this decision
was overruled by a higher authority.40
Andreeva et al.41 using data on a retail
card from three countries, have
demonstrated that exclusion of nationality
in a generic model will discriminate
against certain groups. Combining data
from Belgium, Germany and the
Netherlands it was found that the rejection
rate for the Netherlands increased in the
generic model compared to the models
constructed for the individual countries.
This disproportion in response would
constitute discrimination. Also the study
illustrated the difficulty in ensuring
equality of treatment using different
models. Using the same level of cut-off
within the samples the change between the
groups who would receive credit and
those who would not using a generic
model against a national model is
presented in Table 2.
CONCLUSION
It appears that the anti-discriminatory
legislation works against at least some
protected groups. It fails to ensure greater
access to credit for disadvantaged groups,
but at the same time it leads to
deterioration of the predictive power of
scoring models, which in turn results in an
increased number of bad risks that were
granted credit, when good risks were
denied it, making credit more expensive.
The drive towards integration within
the European Union means that there has
been increasing desire to create
harmonisation. This has an impact on
many aspects. In this paper consideration
has been given to the impact of anti-
discrimination legislation on credit scoring.
The aim of the legislation is to develop
equitable treatment of individuals. It is
currently perceived that this legislation
would achieve this through the
elimination of both direct and indirect
discrimination. Unfortunately, these dual
targets within the context of credit scoring
seem mutually exclusive. If the use of
certain characteristics is prohibited (direct
discrimination), then the protected groups
Table 2 The percentage change in those accepted
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are very likely to suffer from indirect
discrimination. This arises since the group
may suffer higher economic disadvantage
and so a higher probability of default. If
the law wants to combat the unequal
discrimination of credit (indirect
discrimination), then the use of the
relevant information should be allowed.
The objective of the anti-discriminatory
legislation is to achieve equal treatment of
individuals. Use of prohibitive information
in this context is seen by some as
reinforcing the distinction and is therefore
politically unacceptable. It is argued by
others,42 that all variables that are
statistically valid should be used. In fact it
can be advantageous for some groups
normally thought of as disadvantaged,
who might benefit. It is also possible to
devise systems so that the use of such
information can be advantageous, such as
the suggestion by Hand43 that separate
models be built for sub-populations with
the same proportion of rejected
applications. Hence, one has ensured that
credit has been extended to protected
groups on an equal basis. There are,
however, problems with this approach.
First, the sub-populations have to be
identified, which may not be easy in the
case of race and ethnic origin or religion
and belief. Secondly, Martin and Hill27
point out the danger of general
deterioration in credit quality in the long
run, if more individuals are accepted with
a higher likelihood of default. The
resultant increase in costs and potential
decrease in credit availability will have to
be borne by all, including the protected
groups.
Achieving equal treatment may be
regarded as a positive attempt to re-
address discrimination arising out of
modelling. Without the resultant
information discrimination will occur
indirectly. Therefore retention of the
information, while unpalatable, may allow
action to be taken to ensure that fairness is
achieved. This makes the decision a policy
action, rather than an artefact of the
modelling. A balance needs to be struck
between the necessity to ensure that credit
is granted to those who can repay it and
the necessity to protect human rights
within the credit market.
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Table A2 National provisionsa against discrimination on grounds of race/ethnic origin, religion/belief,
disability,
b
age or sexual orientation
Member state Laws or collective agreements Grounds covered Scope




Racial or ethnic origin,
religion or belief and age
Employment
Denmark Act 459 of 12th June, 1996
on prohibition of
discrimination in respect of
employment and occupation
etc
Racial or ethnic origin,
religion or belief and sexual
orientation
Employment
Germany Civil Service codes and the
Works Constitution Act
(Betr.VG)
Racial or ethnic origin,
religion or belief
Employment
Greece No anti-discrimination law. — —




Racial or ethnic origin,
religion or belief and age
Employment
France The Labour Code Racial or ethnic origin, religion







Racial or ethnic origin, religion
or belief, disability and sexual
orientation
Employment
Italy Law no. 300 of 20th May,
1970 (Workers Statute) and
law no. 40 of 6th March,
1998





and goods (law no 40)
Luxembourg No anti-discrimination law — —
The Netherlands
e
The Equal Treatment Act
(1994)
Racial or ethnic origin,




education or career and
provision of goods and
services










Portugal No anti-discrimination law. — —
Finland The Act on Contracts of
Employment
Racial or ethnic origin,
religion or belief, age and
sexual orientation
Employment
Sweden Employment Protection Act
(1982), Ethnic Discrimination
Act (1999), Act on
Discrimination of people




Racial or ethnic origin,





The Race Relations Act
1976 and The Disability
Discrimination Act
1995
Racial or ethnic origin,









a The table does not cover the constitutional provisions. All the MS have articles in their constitutions providing for the equality principles,
except for the UK that does not have a written Constitution
b Only legislation which makes it unlawful to discriminate against disabled people is mentioned in the table. Concerning the integration of
disabled people several member states have systems of compulsory employment or quota schemes (Germany, Greece, Spain, Italy,
Luxembourg, the Netherlands and Austria) while others rely on subsidies to employers
c Revised text approved by the Royal Legislative Decree N 1/1995 of 25th March 1995
d Legislation prohibiting discrimination on the same grounds as The Employment Equality Act in education, the provision of goods and
services and the disposal of property and accommodation (Equal Status Bill) was presented to the National Parliament on 15th April, 1999
e Proposals for legislation prohibiting discrimination on grounds of age and disability is currently being prepared
Source: ‘Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament, the Economic and Social Committee and the
Committee of the Regions on certain Community measures to combat discrimination’ COM (1999) 564 final
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